Security begins before the server
Identity Vault encrypts vault contents on the device with AES-GCM before they are written to disk or sent as a sync blob. A random 256-bit master key is wrapped by a passphrase-derived key. A recovery key wraps the same master key. Biometrics authorise a device-bound Keychain item. Giga Studio does not receive biometric templates.
The current cloud path stores an encrypted vault file. A MySQL ciphertext store, Argon2id, and a reviewed account-server design are specified and not all shipped. This page describes what is true today.
What Giga Studio can see
| Data | Server can read? |
|---|---|
| Vault passwords | No — not in the uploaded blob as plaintext |
| Secure notes, TOTP seeds, files, API keys | No — same encrypted blob |
| Encrypted vault ciphertext | Yes, if you use Identity Vault Cloud |
| Account email / subscription | Not collected by the current Mac app |
| Device/session metadata | Limited local audit; not a marketing profile |
Encryption architecture
Passphrase → PBKDF2-SHA256 (unique salt) → unwraps master key → AES-GCM for the vault body. Recovery key is an independent wrap of the same master key. Target upgrades: Argon2id, per-vault keys, and authentication material kept separate from encryption material.
Agents
Every agent has its own identity and scoped permissions. High-risk secrets are hidden from agents unless you grant an explicit override. Disable All Agents revokes sessions and blocks new secret requests. Humans keep vault access.
Security reporting
Report issues to [email protected]. There is no bug bounty yet. Do not probe production systems without written authorisation.