Security begins before the server

Identity Vault encrypts vault contents on the device with AES-GCM before they are written to disk or sent as a sync blob. A random 256-bit master key is wrapped by a passphrase-derived key. A recovery key wraps the same master key. Biometrics authorise a device-bound Keychain item. Giga Studio does not receive biometric templates.

The current cloud path stores an encrypted vault file. A MySQL ciphertext store, Argon2id, and a reviewed account-server design are specified and not all shipped. This page describes what is true today.

What Giga Studio can see

DataServer can read?
Vault passwordsNo — not in the uploaded blob as plaintext
Secure notes, TOTP seeds, files, API keysNo — same encrypted blob
Encrypted vault ciphertextYes, if you use Identity Vault Cloud
Account email / subscriptionNot collected by the current Mac app
Device/session metadataLimited local audit; not a marketing profile

Encryption architecture

Passphrase → PBKDF2-SHA256 (unique salt) → unwraps master key → AES-GCM for the vault body. Recovery key is an independent wrap of the same master key. Target upgrades: Argon2id, per-vault keys, and authentication material kept separate from encryption material.

Agents

Every agent has its own identity and scoped permissions. High-risk secrets are hidden from agents unless you grant an explicit override. Disable All Agents revokes sessions and blocks new secret requests. Humans keep vault access.

Security reporting

Report issues to [email protected]. There is no bug bounty yet. Do not probe production systems without written authorisation.

Ask about the threat model